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TREATING THE BLUE RASH: WIN-WIN SOLUTIONS  




I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The distribution of federal, state, and private land throughout the West has 
resulted in a fragmented ownership pattern where “no single owner . . . owns enough 
contiguous land to allow effective management of land holdings,” generating “a 
plethora of disputes over access and similar problems.” 1  In particular, the 
disbursements of state trust lands under the western states’ enabling acts have 
created what is known as the “blue rash” on maps of the West.2  
The blue rash spreads into many areas of federal conservation and reservation 
creating two problems: (1) it limits federal land managers’ ability to effectively 
manage environmentally sensitive areas and (2) it complicates management for state 
trust land authorities, who try to generate revenues for schools and other institutions. 
Both federal and state interests are important in preserving western lands and helping 
western states increase resources for education. 
The controversy created by the blue rash is a perennial problem. In an attempt 
to solve the woes resulting from fragmented ownership of western lands, federal 
agencies and state trust authorities seek to exchange land. They conduct these 
exchanges administratively under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA) of 19763 and legislatively by lobbying members of Congress. While 
methods for conducting exchanges present potential win-win solutions to treat the 
blue rash, there are many ways they can be improved.  
This Note argues that while administrative and legislative land exchanges have 
the potential to remedy the blue rash, amendments to FLPMA and other federal 
statutes would significantly improve the process. Specifically, federal agencies and 
state trust authorities should take three steps: (1) Congress should grant more 
funding by amending the Land and Water Conservation Fund to solve agency 
dilemmas; (2) Congress should amend FLPMA’s public-interest- determination 
requirement to promote exchanges between federal agencies and state trust land 
authorities; and (3) Congress should amend FLPMA’s equal value requirement to 
incorporate conservation value as well as other ways to promote fair land exchanges. 
By adopting these amendments, Congress would facilitate the land exchange process 
and save state trust authorities and federal agencies valuable time and money. 
                                                        
∗ © 2015 Smith Monson. 
1  1 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL 
RESOURCES LAW § 2:9 (2d ed. 2014). 
2  Steven M. Davis, Preservation, Resource Extraction, and Recreation on Public 
Lands: A View from the States, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 303, 331–32 (2008). 
3 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–87 (2012). 
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Part II of this Note describes the development of the blue rash, including a 
history of federal land policies. Next, Part III analyzes the problems created by the 
blue rash—namely the conflicting mandates between federal agencies and state trust 
authorities. Part IV analyzes legislative land exchanges involving federal land and 
land managed by the Utah School and Institute Trust Lands Administration (SITLA), 
and argues that while these types of exchanges offer potential win-win solutions, 
they also present other problems. Finally, Part V concludes by offering examples of 
how amending federal statutes could make administrative exchanges a more optimal 
solution.  
 
II.  CREATING THE BLUE RASH: A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL LAND LAWS 
 
A.  Acquisition and Disposal of Federal Lands 
 
The authority of federal land ownership stems from the Property Clause of the 
United States Constitution, which states, “Congress shall have Power to dispose of 
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other 
Property belonging to the United States.”4 The United States Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that this clause gives the federal government authority to own and 
retain lands under Congress’s direction.5 The Court has said congressional power to 
exercise its authority over federal land is “without limitations.”6  
Federal land acquisition began early, when during the nation’s infancy the 
thirteen original states ceded title to the lands west of their borders that Great Britain 
had granted to them.7 The federal government acquired 237 million acres of land 
spanning from the Appalachian Mountains to the Mississippi River as a result of the 
original states’ cessions between 1781 and 1802.8 The federal government continued 
to acquire land through purchase, conquest, or compromise, adding the vast 
expanses west of the Mississippi River.9 Once acquired, these lands became federal 
property administered as territories until Congress admitted new states to the 
Union.10 Over time, the federal government acquired more than 1.8 billion acres of 
land from purchase, conquest, cession, and treaties.11  
                                                        
4 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
5 See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539–40 (1976); Camfield v. United States, 
167 U.S. 518, 525–26 (1897); United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 537–38 (1840). 
6 Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 539 (quoting United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 
(1940)). 
7  PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 49–54 (photo. 
reprint 1979) (1968). 
8 Id. at 49–55. 
9  Id. at 75–86; GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND 
RESOURCES LAW 54–58 (6th ed. 2007). 
10 See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 9, at 54–58. 
11  196 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND 
STATISTICS 2011, at 1 (2012) [hereinafter PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS]. 
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Disposal of federally owned lands started soon after the thirteen states ceded 
their territories.12 The early federal government lacked the power to tax.13 But the 
nation had accumulated large debts from the Revolutionary War.14 Being land-rich 
and cash-poor, the federal government sold some of its newly acquired lands to help 
generate revenue, pay down debt, compensate veterans, and provide for public 
education.15  
When the Continental Congress passed the General Land Ordinance of 1785 
(the “Ordinance”), it established a general policy to generate revenue and pay 
debts.16 The Ordinance also established the federal government’s approach to land 
disposal, which the government used for years to come.17  
In particular, two provisions significantly influenced the disposal of land and 
the development of the blue rash in the West.18 First, the Ordinance established a 
rectangular survey, which set the standard for all subsequent western land 
acquisitions and disposals. 19  The survey divided townships into thirty-six one-
square-mile parcels of 640 acres each.20 These parcels were numbered, starting with 
“1” in the most northeastern corner and ending with “36” in the most southeastern 
corner.21 Second, the Ordinance required that section “16” in each township be 
reserved “for the maintenance of public schools[] within the said township.”22  
                                                        
12 GATES, supra note 7, at 51. 
13 The federal government did not have the power to “lay and collect taxes on incomes” 
until the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1913. U.S. 
CONST. amend. XVI. 
14 COGGINS ET AL., supra note 9, at 54. 
15 See id. 
16 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 375–81 (John C. 
Fitzpatrick ed., 1933) [hereinafter JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS]. 
17 See GATES, supra note 7, at 65 (“The rectangular system was one of the great features 
of the Land Ordinance of 1785 that has been retained in the national land system ever 
since.”); see also JON A. SOUDER & SALLY K. FAIRFAX, STATE TRUST LANDS: HISTORY, 
MANAGEMENT, AND SUSTAINABLE USE 18 (1996) (describing the General Land Ordinance 
as “remarkable for [its] brevity and durability”). 
18 See Erin Pounds, Comment, State Trust Lands: Static Management and Shifting 
Value Perspectives, 41 ENVTL. L. 1333, 1337–38 (2011); see also SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra 
note 17, at 18 (outlining the provisions of the Ordinance). 
19 Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 268 n.3 (1986); see also Jeff Oven & Chris Voigt, 
Comment, Wyoming’s Last Great Range War: The Modern Debate Over the State’s Public 
School Lands, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 75, 78–79 (1999) (stating that the Ordinance 
“initiated a land surveying practice that became the standard for surveying each of the 
western land acquisitions that followed”). 
20 GATES, supra note 7, at 65. 
21 Id. at 125.  
22  JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 16, at 378; SOUDER & 
FAIRFAX, supra note 17, at 18. 
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Following the ratification of the Constitution, Congress continued to pass laws 
to facilitate the land disposal process.23 Congress created the General Land Office 
in 181224 to oversee the disposal of federal lands under laws like the Homestead Act 
of 186225 and General Mining Law of 1872.26 These statutes allowed the Land 
Office to grant, sell, or otherwise transfer federal lands into private ownership.27 
Similarly, railroad land grants in the 1870s provided incentives to develop a vast 
national transportation system.28 These laws focused on entrepreneurs, speculators, 
military veterans, settlers, railroads, developers, and other private entities.29 The 
transfer of federal lands under disposal laws created the checkerboard pattern of land 
ownership in the West that has led to myriad difficulties in managing federal lands.30 
In addition to disposing land to private entities, Congress granted newly 
admitted states land townships within their borders, furthering the fragmented 
ownership in the West and adding splashes of blue to western cartography. 31 
Researchers note the practice of setting aside land for education may date back to 
Henry V, but in the least, “the idea of granting, donating, or bequeathing land in 
support of schools was common throughout the colonial period.” 32 The United 
States Supreme Court, while examining claims brought against the State of 
Mississippi for allegedly breaching its school trust land obligations, noted Congress 
granted these lands for multiple reasons 
 
a combination of an overall practice of encouraging education, a 
congressional desire to accelerate the disposition of western lands at a 
                                                        
23 See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 9, at 64–67 (describing the history of federal land 
disposal); see also COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 1, § 2:2; JANINE BLAELOCH, 
CARVING UP THE COMMONS: CONGRESS & OUR PUBLIC LANDS 1 (2009).  
24 BLAELOCH, supra note 23, at 1; GATES, supra note 7, at 28 (describing the creation 
of the Government Land Office in 1812). 
25 ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 161) (repealed 1976). 
26 ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (1872) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 21–54 (2012)); U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-223, FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT: 
OBSERVATIONS ON A POSSIBLE MOVE OF THE FOREST SERVICE INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF 
THE INTERIOR 7 (2009) [hereinafter GAO FEDERAL LAND REPORT 2009].  
27 See generally GATES, supra note 7, at 127 (“Thus by 1812 there was created the 
administrative machinery that was to manage close to a billion and a half acres spread over 
30 states . . . .”).  
28 BLAELOCH, supra note 23, at 1; see COGGINS ET AL., supra note 9, at 52. 
29 See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 9, at 64. 
30 See Scott K. Miller, Missing the Forest and the Trees: Lost Opportunities for Federal 
Land Exchanges, 38 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 197, 208 (2013) (“The variety of disposal 
programs created an assortment of inefficient landownership patterns.”). 
31 See CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND THE ORIGINAL FEDERAL LAND 
GRANT PROGRAM 2, 8 (2011) [hereinafter CEP], available at http://www.cep-
dc.org/cfcontent_file.cfm?Attachment=Usher_Paper_FederalLandGrants_041311.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/3Q6K-GG7W. 
32 Sally K. Fairfax et al., The School Trust Lands: A Fresh Look at Conventional 
Wisdom, 22 ENVTL. L. 797, 803 (1992). 
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higher price, and a policy of trying to put the public-lands States on some 
sort of a par with the original States in terms of taxable property since 
federal land, a large portion of the new States, was not taxable by them.33  
 
Congress granted states section 16 of each township, fulfilling its promise to 
reserve land for the maintenance of public schools under the Land Ordinance of 
1785.34 Ohio was the first state to receive school land grants under its enabling act, 
which granted each section 16 to the state legislature.35 Subsequent states continued 
to receive grants until the admission of Alaska to the Union in 1959.36 
However, under successive enabling acts, Congress changed the way it granted 
school lands.37 First, as westward expansion ensued, Congress increased the number 
of parcels it granted to the states because western states were arid, not well suited to 
farming, less economically valuable, and home to fewer natural resources.38 As a 
result, Congress gave section 36 as well as section 16 in the enabling acts for many 
western states.39 When states in the most arid regions entered the Union, Congress 
increased the grant to four parcels —as seen in Figure 1—with Utah being the first 
of four states to receive the four sections.40  
  
                                                        
33 Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 269 n.4 (1986). 
34 Id. at 268–69 n.3; SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 17, at 18. 
35 SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 17, at 22. 
36 Marla Valdez, Note, Constitutionality of Educational Land Grants and Mississippi 
State Property Interests Under Review in Papasan v. Allain, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 199, 199 
(1988). 
37 Oven & Voigt, supra note 19, at 79–80; see also Fairfax et al., supra note 32, at 803–
32 (describing the “evolution” of the school land grant).  
38 See Sean E. O’Day, School Trust Lands: The Land Manager’s Dilemma Between 
Educational Funding and Environmental Conservation, A Hobson’s Choice?, 8 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 163, 179–80 (1999); see also Oven & Voigt, supra note 19, at 79. Professors 
Jon A. Souder and Sally K. Fairfax also describe, however, that the school land grants played 
an integral part of the compromise between states. See SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 17, 
at 19–23. Those states that entered the Union later became more adept at the compromise 
and were able to negotiate for more land. Id.; see also Fairfax et al., supra note 32, at 815 
(“[O]ver time the federal government gave more and more land to new and middle-aged 
states before and after accession. The states had become more effective bargainers in their 
own behalf.”). 
39 See SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 17, at 20–21, 25–27; see also CEP, supra note 
31, at 11. 
40 Fairfax et al., supra note 32, at 814 & n.47, 835 fig.2; O’Day, supra note 38, at 180. 
246 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Township survey and land grants in states with four parcels. (Illustration 
by author.) 
 
Second, Congress also changed who received the lands. At first, Congress 
granted the land to the state legislatures.41 Then, Congress granted the school trust 
lands to each of the respective townships.42 Congress granted the school lands to the 
states themselves in the enabling acts of the final states to enter the Union.43 Finally, 
Congress increasingly added language to enabling acts that restricted the use and 
scope of school land grants.44  
For example, Ohio’s Enabling Act limits the grant of section 16 “for the 
maintenance of schools.”45 Congress changed course with later enabling acts by 
specifying that school land grants were “for the use and benefit of the common 
                                                        
41 Oven & Voigt, supra note 19, at 79–80; Fairfax et al., supra note 32, at 817–18. 
42 Fairfax et al., supra note 32, at 817. 
43 Id. 
44 See id. at 818–20. 
45 Fairfax et al., supra note 32, at 818 (describing Ohio’s enabling act, also known as 
the Act of Apr. 30, 1802, ch. 40, 2 Stat. 173). 
6 5 4 3 2 1 6 5 4 3 2 1 6 5 4 3 2 1 
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schools.” 46 Both the Omnibus Enabling Act of 1889—admitting North Dakota, 
South Dakota, Montana, and Washington to the Union—and the enabling acts for 
Idaho and Wyoming specified terms for the sale and lease of the land and prohibited 
sectarian or denominational use of the land.47 By the time New Mexico and Arizona 
acceded to the Union, Congress added further requirements to the management and 
sale of granted lands.48 In the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act, Congress clearly 
stated that all school and institutional grant lands “shall be . . . held in trust.”49 
Several states’ enabling acts do not expressly create a trust for the state over the 
school and institutional lands that Congress granted them. But many courts 
recognize that states must hold these lands in trust for the benefit of public schools 
and other institutions.50 This is largely a result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
in Lassen v. Arizona ex rel. Arizona Highway Department.51 In Lassen, the U.S. 
Supreme Court overturned a decision by the Arizona Supreme Court.52 The Arizona 
decision required Arizona’s state trust land authority to grant a right of way to the 
Arizona Highway Department over certain trust lands without compensation. 53 
Relying on the terms and obligations in the Arizona Enabling Act, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held the Highway Department must compensate the trust for the rights of way. 
The Court said, “[t]he Enabling Act unequivocally demands both that the trust 
receive the full value of any lands transferred from it and that any funds received be 
employed only for the purposes for which the land was given.”54 Many state and 
federal courts have used the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Lassen to find that 
trust principles govern the school and institutional grants found in the enabling acts 
of other western states.55  
                                                        
46 Oklahoma Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 59-234, § 7, 34 Stat. 267, 272 (1906); see also 
Fairfax et al., supra note 32, at 818 (describing the evolution of the enabling acts). 
47 ch. 180, § 11, 25 Stat. 676, 679–80 (1889). 
48 Act of June 20, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-219, §§ 6–10, 36 Stat. 557, 561–65; see also 
SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 17, at 25–26. 
49 § 10, 36 Stat. at 563. 
50 See generally SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 17, at 36–37 (“Trust 
principles . . . have come to dominate judicial understanding of school grants.” (citation 
omitted)). 
51 385 U.S. 458 (1967). 
52 Id. at 459–60. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 466. 
55 See, e.g., Dist. 22 United Mine Workers of Am. v. Utah, 229 F.3d 982, 990 (10th Cir. 
2000) (holding that although the Utah Enabling Act did not create a federal trust, the 
language of the Act gave the Utah legislature discretion to determine management and trust 
principles, and holding that the lands were “held in trust pursuant to the Utah Constitution”); 
United States v. 78.61 Acres of Land in Dawes & Sioux Cntys., 265 F. Supp. 564, 566 (D. 
Neb. 1967) (holding that “the grant was undoubtedly in trust for a specific purpose” and that 
the state was still “under a contractual as well as a constitutional obligation to refrain from 
disposition or alienation of the use of [grant lands] except as allowed by the enabling act and 
the Constitution” (quoting State ex rel. Johnson v. Cent. Neb. Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 
248 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
 
In total, the disposition of federal lands, including but not limited to state land 
grants, has reached nearly 1.3 billion acres.56 Congress granted nearly 78 million 
acres through school and institutional land grants in state enabling acts.57  
The federal government’s pattern of granting state and private lands created a 
fragmented ownership of the American West:   
 
[Today, t]he land ownership map of the West in many places resembles a 
crazy quilt, without reason or coherent pattern. Where the effects of the 
fragmenting grants to miners, railroads, and states are pronounced, often 
no single owner (states, private entities, or the federal government) owns 
enough contiguous land to allow effective management of land holdings. 
Land exchanges and cooperative efforts have accomplished some 
consolidation, but fragmented ownership patterns generate a plethora of 
disputes over access and similar problems.58 
 
This fragmented ownership is further complicated by the fact that the federal 
agencies that manage the undisposed federal lands must adhere to certain mandates, 
which the following the section discusses in more detail. 
  
B.  Withdrawal, Reservation, Retention and Federal Land Management Mandates 
 
While creating policies to dispose of federal lands, Congress also adopted 
policies to withdraw and reserve certain lands for federal purposes. Withdrawing 
federal land removes it from disposal under federal laws. Reserving federal land 
removes the land from disposal for a particular national purpose. One example was 
The Land Ordinance of 1785’s reservation of section 16 of every township to 
maintain public schools.59 Other reservations included the authorization and funding 
of military reservations.60 
  
                                                        
8 N.W.2d 841, 847–48 (Neb. 1943))); Cnty. of Skamania v. State, 685 P.2d 576, 583 (Wash. 
1984) (holding that the reasoning in Lassen applied to Washington’s Enabling Act). 
56 PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS, supra note 11, at 1. 
57 Id. at 5. 
58 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 1, § 2.9 (citations omitted). 
59 GATES, supra note 7, at 65. 
60 GAO FEDERAL LAND REPORT 2009, supra note 26, at 6–7. 




FIGURE 2. Federal land managers in the West.61  
 
Early on, withdrawal and reservation policies focused on retaining lands for 
future disposals or future reservations, including Indian trading posts, military and 
mineral reservations, and other public purposes.62 With the reservation of Yosemite 
and Yellowstone in the nineteenth century, Congress paved the way for reserving 
lands for recreation and preservation uses.63 Other national parks followed, and soon 
thereafter, Congress enacted the National Park Organic Act,64 laying the foundation 
for the National Park System. 65  In 1891, Congress authorized the President to 
reserve and protect forests, which led to the creation of the National Forest System.66 
In 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt pioneered the use of withdrawal to protect 
                                                        
61 Id. at 14 fig.1. 
62 1 CHARLES F. WHEATLEY, JR., STUDY OF WITHDRAWALS AND RESERVATIONS OF 
PUBLIC DOMAIN LANDS 55–60 (1969). 
63  See JOSEPH L. SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS: REFLECTIONS ON THE 
NATIONAL PARKS 5–8 (1980). 
64 National Park Service Organic Act, Pub. L. No. 64-235, 39 Stat. 535 (1916) (codified 
as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1–4 (2012)). 
65 See SAX, supra note 63, at 5. 
66 General Revision Act, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103 (1891) (repealed 1976); 
BLAELOCH, supra note 23, at 2. 
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wildlife habitats, leading to the National Wildlife Refuge System.67 Today, many 
federal agencies—including the National Park Service, the U.S. Forest Service, and 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service—manage these withdrawn and reserved lands.68 
Along with withdrawal and reservation policies, retention policies also created 
a marked shift from disposal of federal lands and led to the creation of the Bureau 
of Land Management (BLM). Retaining federal lands keeps otherwise disposable 
lands in federal ownership. Retention of federal lands started with the Taylor 
Grazing Act of 1934.69 Under the Act, Congress created the U.S. Grazing Service to 
manage livestock grazing on federal lands, which was the first step toward ending 
federal land disposal.70 As the years passed, controversies arose over the Grazing 
Service’s management policies, and as a result, the federal government merged the 
Service with the General Land Office to create the BLM in 1946.71 
As the nation’s population expanded and society became more and more mobile, 
the demand for public land use increased.72 Congress responded by enacting two 
laws in 1964 that continued the shift from disposal to retention. The first law created 
the Public Land Law Review Commission (PLLRC), which was to recommend 
“modifications in existing laws, regulations, policies, and practices” to determine 
whether and which federal lands should be retained or disposed.73 The second law, 
the Classification and Multiple Use Act, ordered the BLM to classify lands for 
retention or disposal and to manage those lands for multiple purposes pending 
recommendations by the PLLRC.74 In 1970, the PLLRC completed its commission 
and recommended 
 
[t]he policy of large-scale disposal of public lands . . . be revised and that 
future disposal should be only those lands that will achieve maximum 
benefit for the general public in non-Federal ownership, while retaining in 
Federal ownership those whose values must be preserved so that they may 
be used and enjoyed by all Americans.75 
                                                        
67  Robert L. Fischman, The Significance of National Wildlife Refuges in the 
Development of U.S. Conservation Policy, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 9–11 (2005) 
(describing President Roosevelt and the creation of Pelican Island). 
68 See GAO FEDERAL LAND REPORT 2009, supra note 26, at 7. 
69 Pub. L. No. 73-482, 48 Stat. 1269 (1934) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 315–
315r (2012)). 
70 See id. § 1, 48 Stat. at 1269 (requiring the Grazing Service to manage only those 
lands “pending [their] final disposal”). 
71 Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1946, § 403, 60 Stat. 1097, 1100 (codified as amended 
at 43 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012)). 
72 PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS, supra note 11, at 1. 
73 Act of Sept. 19, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-606, § 4, 78 Stat. 982, 983 (expired 1970) 
(previously codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1391–93); see also id. § 1, 78 Stat. at 982 (detailing the 
purpose of the PLLRC). 
74 Pub. L. No. 88-607, § 1(a), 78 Stat. 986, 986 (1964) (expired 1970) (previously 
codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1411–18). 
75 U.S. PUB. LAND LAW REVIEW COMM’N, ONE-THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND: A 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO CONGRESS 1 (1970) [hereinafter PLLRC REPORT]. 
2015 TREATING THE BLUE RASH 251 
 
 
Following these two laws and the PLLRC’s recommendations, Congress 
formally ended the disposal of federal lands by enacting the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976.76 Section 1701(a) of FLPMA states,  
 
Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States that . . . public 
lands be retained in Federal ownership, unless as a result of the land use 
planning procedure provided for in this Act, it is determined that disposal 
of a particular parcel will serve the national interest.77  
 
“Today, the BLM administers about 247.5 million surface acres of public land 
and approximately 700 million acres of Federal subsurface mineral estate in the 
United States,” making it the largest of the federal land management agencies.78 
Most of the BLM’s lands are in Alaska and eleven other western states.79 
Thus, the withdrawal, reservation, and retention policies of the United States 
created a vast management system of federal land that is spread primarily throughout 
the West. These policies, along with the disposal policies of much of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, created a land ownership pattern that often makes islands of 
state and private land holdings within federally withdrawn, reserved, or retained 
lands, or vice versa. In particular, many of the congressionally granted school and 
institutional trust lands end up as islands amidst federally owned and managed lands. 
Many maps of the West identify school grant lands in blue,80 which led to the 
moniker “blue rash.”  
The following section discusses in more detail the problems that arise from 
fragmented ownership, particularly as they relate to the objectives of federal land 
managers and state trust authorities, whose mandates often conflict and make it 
difficult to effectively manage lands in the West.  
 
III.  PROBLEMS OF THE BLUE RASH: CONFLICTING MANDATES 
 
The problem with the blue rash in management of western lands is twofold. 
First, the fragmented land ownership deters federal land managers from effectively 
managing their lands according to their mandates, especially if these lands are 
reserved for environmental protection.81 Second, the fragmented land ownership 
                                                        
76 Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–
87 (2012)). 
77 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (2012).  
78 PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS, supra note 11, at 1. 
79 Id. at 7. 
80 See, e.g., Utah Land Status and Areas of Responsibility, STATE OF UTAH SCHOOL & 
INSTITUTIONAL TRUST LANDS ADMINISTRATION (October 2014), http://tlamap.trustlands. 
utah.gov/download/maps/statewide/SurfaceMineral_st36x48_shd.pdf, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/5Z6B-774E. 
81 See Martin Nie, Whatever Happened to Ecosystem Management and Federal Land 
Planning?, in THE LAWS OF NATURE: REFLECTIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF ECOSYSTEM 
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limits state trust land authorities’ ability to effectively meet their mandates to 
manage the land for the benefit of trust beneficiaries like public schools and 
institutions.82  
This section begins by briefly addressing the general federal land management 
mandates. The section then examines in more detail the conflict between the BLM’s 
conservation mandate in managing Wilderness Study Areas (WSAs) and the Utah 
School and Institutional Land Administration’s (SITLA) mandate to manage state 
trust lands.  
 
A.  Federal Agency Mandates 
 
The various federal land management agencies operate under different 
mandates. Some, including the BLM, operate under more than one mandate 
depending on how land is designated. In general, the BLM and the Forest Service 
manage their lands under the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act.83 This mandate 
requires the agencies to account for multiple uses of the land, including recreation 
and providing for a sustained yield of renewable resources, including timber, fish 
and wildlife, and forage for livestock. 84  Where BLM lands are designated for 
environmental protection, like Wilderness Study Areas, the BLM operates under a 
stricter mandate to manage the lands for preservation purposes.85 
Under its mandate, the National Park Service manages lands “in such manner 
and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future 
generations.” 86  This unimpaired mandate includes the conservation of scenery, 
natural and historical objects, and wildlife.87 Similarly, the Fish and Wildlife Service 
manages its lands for the benefit of present and future generations, conserving and 
restoring fish, wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats where appropriate.88 
  
                                                        
MANAGEMENT LAW & POLICY 68, 69 (Kalyani Robbins ed., 2013) (“[T]he ‘blue rash’ of 
state trust lands scattered throughout the West . . . presents multiple challenges to ecosystem 
management.”). 
82 Jason M. Keith, Note, The 1998 Utah Schools and Lands Exchange Act: Project 
BOLD II, 19 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 325, 337 (1999). Keith argues that federal 
reservations and environmentally sensitive designated areas, like national parks and BLM 
Wilderness Study Areas, impact a state trust authority’s ability to meet its mandate when 
state trust lands are located within those areas because the development potential of those 
lands is limited to the mandate of the adjacent federal land. Id. 
83 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 529, 1604(e)(1) (2012); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(7), 1712(c)(1) (2012). 
84 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 529, 1604(e)(1); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(7), 1712(c)(1). 
85 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c). 
86 See 16 U.S.C. § 1. 
87 See id. 
88 See id. § 668dd. 
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B.  The Conflict Between Wilderness Study Area and SITLA Mandates 
 
The conflicts between federal land managers and state trust authorities often 
occur within federal conservation areas because of incompatible mandates. For 
example, as part of the BLM’s multiple-use mandate, FLPMA requires the BLM to 
identify “roadless areas of five thousand acres or more . . . as having wilderness 
characteristics as described in the Wilderness Act.”89 The wilderness characteristics 
under the Wilderness Act include land that 
 
(1) generally appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of 
nature, with the imprint of man’s work substantially unnoticeable;  
(2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and 
unconfined type of recreation;  
(3) has at least five thousand acres of land or is of sufficient size as to make 
practicable its preservation and use in an unimpaired condition; and  
(4) may also contain ecological, geological, or other features of scientific, 
educational, scenic, or historical value.90  
 
Once the BLM identifies potential wilderness areas, it must send them to 
Congress for review and designation.91 After review, Congress may designate these 
areas as wilderness areas for the preservation of the wilderness resources or release 
them for non-wilderness uses.92 The areas pending review are known as Wilderness 
Study Areas (WSAs), and, pending such review, the BLM “shall continue to manage 
such lands . . . in a manner so as not to impair the suitability of such areas for 
preservation as wilderness.” 93  This language is known as the non-impairment 
standard.94  
Generally, the non-impairment standard requires the BLM to prohibit actions 
or impacts that contradict Congress’s prerogatives under the Wilderness Act. 95 
Specifically, the non-impairment standard precludes road construction or other 
surface-disturbing development activities, effectively eliminating development 
within WSAs.96 
SITLA’s mandate requires that trust lands be managed in the “most prudent and 
profitable manner possible” to support public schools and institutions.97 In doing so, 
                                                        
89 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a). 
90 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c). 
91 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a)–(b). 
92 Id. § 1782(c). 
93 Id. 
94  See generally Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 59 (2004) 
(identifying section 1782 as a non-impairment standard). 
95 See 43 U.S.C. § 1782; 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c). 
96 See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (prohibiting all commercial enterprises within designated 
wilderness areas except existing road construction, motorized equipment, facilities, and 
private rights). 
97 UTAH CODE ANN. § 53C-1-102(2)(b) (West 2014). 
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SITLA “must be concerned with both income for the current beneficiaries and the 
preservation of trust assets for future beneficiaries, which requires a balancing of 
short and long-term interests so that long-term benefits are not lost in an effort to 
maximize short-term gains.” 98  However, the mandate of each state’s trust land 
authority should not be simplified as merely creating an obligation to “secure the 
highest monetary return” for its beneficiaries.99 Rather,  
 
the trust doctrine is more flexible than supposed. Maximum economic 
benefit is a very flexible mandate. More important, the trust mandate to 
preserve the corpus of the trust while making the trust productive permits 
more conservative management, and a broader range of social benefits, 
than the maximum benefits perspective at first implies.100  
 
When SITLA lands are found within federal reservations and preservation areas 
like WSAs, it invites conflict between the state and federal authorities. The conflict 
arises because the federal mandates limit the development potential of SITLA and 
other states’ trust authorities’ lands.101 Similarly, the landlocked SITLA and state 
trust authority lands limit the ability of the BLM and other federal agencies to 
manage and protect wilderness. This is because the state trust authorities may seek 
to develop their inholdings, resulting in roads or other improvements within a WSA 
or other preservation area.102  
 
IV.  TREATING THE BLUE RASH WITH LAND EXCHANGES: THE POTENTIAL WIN-
WIN SOLUTIONS AND IMPROVING THE PROCESS 
 
To treat the conflicting mandates that arise from the blue rash, many state trust 
authorities and federal agencies have sought to use the land exchange process.103 
Currently, there are two processes available to effect land exchanges between federal 
and nonfederal parties, including state trust authorities. First, parties may work 
directly with federal agencies—generally the BLM or Forest Service—to negotiate 
                                                        
98 Id. § 53C-1-102(2)(c). 
99 WILLIAM C. PATRIC, TRUST LAND ADMINISTRATION IN THE WESTERN STATES 7 
(1981). 
100 Id. at 801–02.  
101 See Keith, supra note 82, at 337. 
102 See Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1002 (D. Utah 1979) (holding that state trust 
authorities must have access to inholdings within federal wilderness areas because “[w]ithout 
access[,] the state could not develop the trust lands in any fashion and they would become 
economically worthless”); see also Miller, supra note 30, at 213–14 (“The Agencies are 
burdened by the perpetual need to provide for and regulate both access across the federal 
lands for non-federal inholders and their own access across non-federal lands.”). 
103 See Miller, supra note 30, at 215; RALEIGH BARLOWE ET AL., LAND DISPOSAL 
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: A STUDY PREPARED FOR THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW 
COMMISSION 141 (1970) (“Land exchanges provide a highly rational solution to an irrational 
land management situation.”). 
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an administrative land exchange under FLPMA. Second, a party desiring to 
exchange land with the federal government may work with members of Congress to 
authorize or require an exchange.  
Land exchanges can be an effective method to treat the problems associated 
with the blue rash, and they may even present a potential win-win solution that 
allows federal and state land managers to better meet their respective mandates. 
These win-win solutions have mostly been effectuated through legislative land 
exchanges. However, while land exchanges present win-win solutions, both 
administrative and legislative exchanges are difficult and often require significant 
resources and time. 
First, this section briefly describes the process behind administrative exchanges 
and lists potential reasons why state trust authorities resort to Congress when 
conducting an exchange. Second, this section examines legislative exchanges in 
Utah and how they may provide win-win solutions. Finally, this section argues that, 
while important to help address problems with the blue rash, legislative exchanges 
do not provide the optimal solution because they fail to effectively involve the public 
and require more time and resources than are needed to complete an exchange. 
Rather, a better way to address the blue rash is for Congress to amend federal statutes 
to incentivize cooperation between federal land managers and state trust authorities. 
Such incentives would still allow public concerns to be effectively addressed while 
decreasing the time it takes to complete an exchange that would otherwise go 
through the legislative process.  
 
A.  Administrative Exchanges 
 
Most administrative land exchanges involve the BLM and the Forest Service 
because these agencies manage the most acreage of federal land. 104  FLPMA 
authorizes both agencies to conduct administrative land exchanges.105 Other federal 
statutes, like the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA), and agency policies place additional restrictions on the exchange 
process.106  
                                                        
104 See Miller, supra note 30, at 206. 
105 See 43 U.S.C. § 1716 (2012). For a more comprehensive discussion of the history 
of land exchange law, see Bill Paul, Statutory Land Exchanges that Reflect “Appropriate” 
Value and “Well Serve” the Public Interest, 27 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 107, 112 
(2006) (describing the history of the Weeks Act of 1911, the General Exchange Act of 1922, 
and the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934). The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 added an important 
criterion for land exchanges by allowing the Grazing Service (predecessor to the BLM) to 
“engage in land exchanges of equal value only if the public interest would benefit from such 
exchanges.” Id. (emphasis omitted). 
106 See Miller, supra note 30, at 231–33 (outlining restrictions on the land exchange 
process under NEPA and other agency regulations); Paul, supra note 105, at 113 (outlining 
ESA’s restrictions on land exchanges).  
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FLPMA provides objectives and procedural obligations for the agency 
executing the exchange.107 Under FLPMA, agencies must adhere to two primary 
requirements: (1) that exchanges well serve the public interest and (2) that exchanges 
of land be of equal value.108  
First, in considering what well serves the public interest, “the Secretary 
concerned shall give full consideration to better Federal land management and the 
needs of State and local people, including needs for lands for the economy, 
community expansion, recreation areas, food, fiber, minerals, and fish and 
wildlife.”109 These factors must be weighed against the agency’s value in keeping 
the land.110 Such land exchanges may only occur within the same state so as not to 
deplete state land holdings and potential royalties in the counties.111 
Typically, courts grant significant deference under the arbitrary and capricious 
standard to agency decisions regarding the public interest.112 In National Coal Ass’n 
v. Hodel,113 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit exhibited such deference, 
stating “[t]he Secretary’s public interest determination is one involving a variety of 
factors, the relative weights of which are left in his discretion. We will not second-
guess his conclusion that the [land] exchange . . . was in the public interest.”114 
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals described FLPMA as giving the 
agency the “authority and responsibility to define the contours of ‘public 
interest.’”115 Also, the court clarified that the authority to determine whether an 
exchange well serves the public interest does not extend to a state “for itself or for 
its citizens.”116  
Thus, under arbitrary and capricious judicial review, agency determinations of 
what well serves public interest may not coincide with what a state trust authority 
determines to be in the public interest. Yet both the federal and state interests are 
important. The deferential review may deter state trust authorities from challenging 
an agency’s denial of a land exchange for not being in the public interest, potentially 
discouraging them from taking part in the process from the beginning. 
FLPMA’s second major requirement demands the lands exchanged be of equal 
value, as determined by appraisal.117 If the lands are not of equal value, they may be 
equalized in cash payments not to exceed 25% of the total value of the federal land 
                                                        
107 43 U.S.C. § 1716. 
108 Id. § 1716(a)–(b). 
109 Id. § 1716(a). 
110 Id. § 1716(b); see also Paul, supra note 105, at 112–13. 
111  43 U.S.C. § 1716(b); see also Holly Chamberlain, A Plan of Action: A New 
Alternative to Traditional School Trust Land Exchanges in the West?, 23 J. LAND 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 241, 250 (2003). 
112 See Nat’l Coal Ass’n v. Hodel, 825 F.2d 523, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
113 825 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
114 Id. at 532. 
115 State ex rel. Sullivan v. Lujan, 969 F.2d 877, 883 (10th Cir. 1992). 
116 Id. 
117 43 U.S.C. § 1716(b), (d) (2012). 
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in the exchange.118 BLM and Forest Service regulations state, an exchange “shall 
comply with the appraisal standards . . . and, to the extent appropriate, with the 
[Department of Justice] Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land 
Acquisitions . . . when appraising the values of the Federal and non-Federal lands 
involved in an exchange.”119  
In Andrus v. Utah,120 the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the Secretary of the 
Interior’s authority to determine equal value in the context of exchanges involving 
federal and state trust lands.121 In that case, Utah’s state land authority (now SITLA) 
sought in lieu selections, or land parcels elsewhere, to replace originally granted 
lands that were unavailable for reasons such as settlement.122 Utah “argued that the 
Secretary of the Interior had to approve any lands that the state chose so long as the 
lands were equal in size to the originally designated lands.”123 The Secretary argued, 
however, that the equal value requirement meant equal monetary value and not equal 
acreage. Therefore, the Secretary could refuse the selection because the lands the 
state sought to acquire and the lands it sought to dispose had a “grossly disparate 
value.”124 The Supreme Court agreed with the federal government, stating that it 
could not “identify any sensible justification for Utah’s position that it is entitled to 
select any mineral lands it chooses regardless of the value of the school sections 
lost.”125 Thus, in land exchanges, equal value is not a matter of equal acreage; it 
considers only equal monetary value. 
In determining the monetary value of lands to be exchanged, BLM and Forest 
Service regulations require that “[a] qualified appraiser[] shall provide to the [federal 
agency] appraisals estimating the market value of Federal and non-Federal 
properties involved in an exchange.”126 In estimating market values, an appraiser 
must consider the highest and best use of the appraised properties as well as the 
market value or prices paid for similar properties in a competitive market.127  
Courts have held the highest and best use under the Uniform Appraisal 
Standards for Federal Land Acquisition means, “the highest and most profitable use 
for which the property is adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the 
reasonably near future.”128 Additionally, courts hold “the highest and best use must 
also be: (1) physically possible; (2) legally permissible; (3) financially feasible; and 
                                                        
118 Id. § 1716(b). 
119 43 C.F.R. § 2201.3 (2013); 36 C.F.R. § 254.9 (2013).  
120 446 U.S. 500 (1980). 
121 Id. at 520. 
122 Id. at 501. 
123 Jeremy Eyre, The San Rafael Swell and the Difficulties in State-Federal Land 
Exchanges, 23 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 269, 271 (citing Andrus, 446 U.S. at 504). 
124 Andrus, 446 U.S. at 503–04. 
125 Id. at 510. 
126 43 C.F.R. § 2201.3-1(a) (2013); 36 C.F.R. § 254.9(a) (2013). 
127 43 C.F.R. § 2201.3-2(a); 36 C.F.R. § 254.9(b). 
128 E.g., Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 606 F.3d 1058, 
1066–67 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations marks omitted). 
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(4) must result in the highest value.” 129  Thus, potential improvements may be 
considered in an appraisal under the above criteria. 
While FLPMA governs the land exchange process, other laws significantly 
impact the process. One such law is the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
of 1969.130 NEPA is a procedural requirement that ensures a federal agency will take 
a hard look at the environmental consequences of a federal action and evaluate 
potential project alternatives before making a final decision. 131 NEPA does not 
preclude a federal agency from taking actions with adverse environmental impacts; 
it simply requires that the agency fully understand and consider adverse impacts as 
early as possible in the decision process.132 The Act states that its policies and goals 
supplement those of federal agencies.133 
NEPA requires completion of a detailed statement on the environmental effects 
that are likely to result from major federal actions significantly affecting the quality 
of the human environment.134 This requirement is normally satisfied by completion 
of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). 135  An EIS must evaluate 
environmental impacts and possible alternatives to the action.136 The lead agency 
may prepare an environmental assessment (EA) to determine if the proposed action 
would produce a significant environmental impact. 137  If the agency finds no 
significant impact, it releases a finding of no significant impact (FONSI), which 
details why the agency has chosen not to conduct an EIS.138 Land exchanges are 
almost certain to constitute major federal actions significantly affecting the 
environment, and therefore, require completion of an EIS.139  
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA)140 also significantly impacts land 
exchanges. If a listed species is present on lands proposed for exchange, the ESA 
requires that the exchange agency enter into consultation with the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service.141 Consultation works to “insure that any [land exchange] . . . is 
not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or 
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of [critical] 
habitat.”142 Thus, if a species is listed, the ESA applies and may significantly limit 
                                                        
129 E.g., id. at 1067. 
130 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–70h (2012). 
131 Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000).  
132 See id. at 1141–42. 
133 42 U.S.C. § 4335. 
134 Id. § 4332(2)(C). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2013). 
138 Id. § 1508.13. 
139 See Miller, supra note 30, at 202 (describing the Black River Land Exchange, a 
Forest Service exchange that was reversed and remanded for NEPA review). 
140 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2012). 
141 Id. § 1536(a)(2) & (c)(1). 
142 Id. § 1536(a)(2). 
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the parameters of the land exchange. It may also take more time to complete an 
exchange because of the mandatory involvement of another federal agency. 
Together FLPMA, NEPA, and the ESA require an integrated, holistic 
management approach that maintains the biological diversity of plant and animal 
species in a given region.143 This holistic approach prioritizes conservation in the 
land exchange process.144 Indeed, the federal interest in conservation may create an 
incentive for federal agencies to engage in exchanges that advance conservation 
objectives by facilitating sensitive landscape protection. 
The administrative land exchange process has had mixed results over FLPMA’s 
lifetime. For example, in a 2009 report, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) showed that from 1989 to 1999 the Forest Service completed an average of 
115 exchanges per year.145 In contrast, from 2000 to 2008, the agency completed 
just 29 exchanges per year.146 From 2003 to 2011, the BLM initiated only 132 
applications for land exchanges in many of the western states.147 These numbers 
account for all land exchanges with the BLM, including with private parties.148 
Federal-state land exchanges are presumably an even smaller portion of these 
accounted exchanges. 
The GAO lists three main reasons for a decline in agency land exchanges: “the 
availability of qualified staff, changing priorities, and the availability of funding.”149 
As discussed below, addressing the problems identified by the GAO could lead to a 
rise in the number of exchanges between federal agencies and state trust 
authorities.150 In turn, more exchanges could lead to improved efficiency in land 
conservation and management and improved revenues for schools and other 
institutions.151 
Leading up to these problems, many criticized certain BLM and Forest Service 
land exchanges. This scrutiny resulted from many complaints that multiple 
exchanges failed to meet FLPMA’s standards.152 First, agencies did not follow the 
                                                        
143 See Paul, supra note 105, at 113. 
144 Id. at 113; see Robert B. Keiter, Biodiversity Conservation and the Intermixed 
Ownership Problem: From Nature Reserves to Collaborative Processes, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 
301, 312–14 (2002). 
145  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-611, FEDERAL LAND 
MANAGEMENT: BLM AND THE FOREST SERVICE HAVE IMPROVED OVERSIGHT OF THE LAND 
EXCHANGE PROCESS, BUT ADDITIONAL ACTIONS ARE NEEDED 16 (2009) [hereinafter GAO 
EXCHANGE REPORT 2009]. 
146 Id. 
147 Bureau of Land Mgmt., BLM Land Exchanges—Completed, Pending, Terminated, 
FY 2003 to Present (Nov. 2, 2012) [hereinafter BLM Spreadsheet] (unpublished spreadsheet) 
(on file with Utah Law Review) (showing 132 Federal-state land exchanges). 
148 Id. 
149 GAO EXCHANGE REPORT 2009, supra note 145, at 8, 17–19. 
150 See infra Part III.C. 
151 See id. 
152  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-00-73, BLM AND THE FOREST 
SERVICE: LAND EXCHANGES NEED TO REFLECT APPROPRIATE VALUE AND SERVE THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST 23–27 (2000). 
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requirements needed to show the land exchanges they conducted served the public 
interest. 153 Second, many exchanges resulted in a net loss in value of the land 
exchanged in contrast to FLPMA’s equal value requirement.154  
In effort to fix the image of administrative land exchanges, the BLM and the 
Forest Service adopted more stringent appraisal policies.155 In a 2009 report, the 
GAO said the new procedures required the appraisals to be scrutinized by higher 
agency officials. 156  The report states: “To ensure that exchanges were meeting 
requirements and agency guidance, both agencies established headquarters 
exchange review teams in 1998 and required the teams to review most exchanges at 
two critical stages during the exchange process—the feasibility and the decision 
stages.”157  
These new appraisal procedures may deter state trust land authorities from 
seeking to exchange lands with the agencies administratively because they may 
result in lost time and money.158 This is especially true when agency approval of 
appraisals take close to a year or more.159 After that period of time, an appraisal may 
no longer reflect market values, which may pose significant loss to the state trust 
authority’s or federal agency’s land values.160  
In addition to delayed appraisal approval, the GAO notes agencies often require 
the nonfederal party to pay for the appraisal process because of constraints on the 
agency.161 Thus, the combination of having to pay for an appraisal with the potential 
that the appraisal may not be approved in a timely manner creates disincentives for 
state trust authorities to seek administrative land exchanges because they may waste 
valuable time and money.162 
                                                        
153 Id. at 4, 20–23. 
154 Id. at 4 (stating the BLM and Forest Service “have given more than fair market value 
for nonfederal land they acquired and accepted less than fair market value for federal land 
they conveyed because the appraisals used to estimate the lands’ values did not always meet 
federal standards”). 
155 GAO EXCHANGE REPORT 2009, supra note 145, at 26–27. Procedurally, both the 
BLM and Forest Service undergo five steps for a given exchange: (1) develop exchange 
proposals; (2) evaluate the feasibility of exchange proposals; (3) exchange processing and 
documentation—including NEPA documentation and any arbitration of appraisal disputes; 
(4) decision analysis and approval—review of decision by Washington D.C.; and (5) title 
transfer. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., REL. 2-294, LAND EXCHANGE HANDBOOK H-2200-1 
(PUBLIC) 1-15 to 1-17 (2005). 
156 GAO EXCHANGE REPORT 2009, supra note 145, at 26–27. 
157 Id. at 27. 
158 Id. at 15–16 (noting the timeliness of the appraisal process often causes significant 
agency delays in executing land exchanges). 
159 Interview with Joy Wehking, Realty Specialist, Bureau of Land Mgmt., Utah State 
Office, in Salt Lake City, Utah (Nov. 5, 2012). 
160 Id. 
161 GAO EXCHANGE REPORT 2009, supra note 145, at 18. 
162  See id. at 10 (explaining that the nonfederal party grows disinterested in the 
exchange and withdraws from the process when a new appraisal is required). 
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The complex and overlapping web of statutes, regulations, and policies 
applicable to federal land exchanges necessitates a balancing of numerous 
competing but legitimate government interests. Striking this balance takes time and 
careful analysis, which can drive up the costs involved in acting upon exchange 
proposals. The difficult process of wading through the rigorous public interest and 
appraisal standards that protect important federal interests in an exchange may 
increase conflicts between the federal agencies and the state trust authorities.  
Adding to the conflict, agencies face significant challenges in the exchange 
process because of internal agency constraints—loss of qualified staff, decreases in 
agency funding, and changes in priorities. Taken together, these strains on the land 
exchange process weaken conservation goals for public lands and prevent federal 
and state land managers from effectively managing their lands. These constraints 
and conflicts may influence state trust authorities to approach Congress to legislate 
exchanges, which the next section analyzes in more detail. 
 
B.  Legislative Land Exchanges as a Win-Win to Treat the Blue Rash: Examples 
from Utah 
 
Utah has often sought legislative exchanges to remedy the problems associated 
with SITLA inholdings within federal lands. Starting in the 1980s, Governor Scott 
Matheson proposed “Project BOLD” in response to the ruling in Andrus.163 Project 
BOLD sought to facilitate an unprecedented exchange of 2.5 million acres of state 
trust lands that were scattered across the state, many parcels of which were 
inholdings within protected federal lands, for 2.5 million acres of federal lands that 
were consolidated and more suitable for development.164  
Though this proposed legislative exchange had great potential, Project BOLD 
failed because many feared the valuation process, and it was unclear “how the 
different state and federal systems would exchange mineral values.”165 Also, many 
did not want to interrupt the status quo, including ranchers and mining companies 
that did not want to lose their preferential treatment under the BLM’s land 
management.166 Project BOLD may simply have been too big and come too early.167 
Despite Project BOLD’s failings, other examples from Utah indicate that federal-
                                                        
163 See, e.g., Chamberlain, supra note 111, at 253 (stating that Governor Matheson 
initiated Project BOLD to solve Utah’s “trust lands inholding problem and increase revenue 
from these lands”). 
164 See UTAH NATURAL RESOURCES & ENERGY, PROJECT BOLD: ALTERNATIVES FOR 
UTAH LAND CONSOLIDATION AND EXCHANGE (1982) [hereinafter Project BOLD]; see Keith, 
supra note 82, at 334–39. 
165 Keith, supra note 82, at 336. 
166 See id.  
167 See id. at 344. 
262 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
 
state trust land exchanges may provide a “win-win” solution for all parties 
involved.168  
One such example is the Utah Schools and Land Exchange Act (USLEA) of 
1998.169 Leading up to this exchange, President Clinton designated 1.7 million acres 
as the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument (Monument) in 1996 under 
the authority of the Antiquities Act of 1906.170 Many of Utah’s leaders publicly 
challenged President Clinton’s move. 171  SITLA filed suit against the federal 
government over the designation because it threatened SITLA’s ability to generate 
revenues by creating over 177,000 acres of state trust inholdings.172  
Secretary Bruce Babbitt started negotiations with Governor Mike Leavitt in 
response to the SITLA lawsuit and the immediate public outcry related to the 
Monument being created “at the expense of Utah’s schoolchildren.” 173 As a result 
of the negotiations, Congress approved the exchange of over 376,000 acres of 
SITLA inholdings within the Monument and other national parks and monuments, 
for federally owned lands, subsurface mineral rights, and $50 million.174 Congress 
also declared the land exchange satisfied FLPMA requirements.175 USLEA was an 
effective, win-win solution because it allowed SITLA to secure lands it could 
develop.176 The exchange also consolidated lands with high conservation value in 
the Monument and other federal conservation areas, facilitating effective federal 
management of the lands.177  
The Utah Recreational Land Exchange Act of 2009 (URLEA), 178 provides 
another example of a win-win solution. Under URLEA, the BLM will acquire over 
                                                        
168  See Matthew Kirkegaard, Land Exchanges and Public Land Bills in Utah, 14 
HINCKLEY J. POL. 15, 17 (2013) (“Despite the challenges associated with land exchanges and 
county lands bills, there are a host of benefits to be considered as well.”). 
169 Pub. L. No. 105-335, 112 Stat. 3139 (1998). 
170  Cynthia Heideman, Note and Comment, Multiple Use Policies in the Grand 
Staircase-Escalante National Monument: Is Clinton’s Promise Legitimate or Mere Political 
Rhetoric?, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 37, 37 (2001). 
171 Keith, supra note 82, at 338. 
172 BLAELOCH, supra note 23, at 27–28.  
173  Keith, supra note 82, at 338, 342–44 (quoting Jim Woolf, A Pretty, Great 
Monument?; Clinton Likes it, Many Utahns Don’t, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 19, 1996, at A1.) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
174 Id. at 342–43. 
175 See Utah Schools and Lands Exchange Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-335, § 2(9), (15), 
112 Stat. 3139, 3140–41 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2012)) (stating that 
passing USLEA is in the public’s interest and that the exchange of interest between Utah and 
the United States in USLEA was equal in value). 
176 See id. § 2(3), 112 Stat. at 3139. 
177  See id. § 2(14), 112 Stat. at 3141 (describing USLEA as resolving “many 
longstanding environmental conflicts”). 
178 Pub. L. No. 111-53, 123 Stat. 1982 (2009). 
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25,000 acres of lands “with high conservation and recreation value.”179 In return 
SITLA will acquire nearly 35,000 acres of land with high development potential.180 
The exchange is a win-win because it “protects environmentally-sensitive lands 
along the Colorado River corridor and helps position SITLA with lands more 
suitable for development.”181  
Lastly, a potential win-win legislative exchange is found in the proposed Hill 
Creek Cultural Preservation and Energy Development Act (“Hill Creek”).182 On 
January 22, 2013, Senators Orrin Hatch and Mike Lee introduced the Hill Creek 
proposal to prompt the exchange of culturally and environmentally sensitive SITLA 
lands found within the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation for unappropriated 
BLM and reservation lands.183 As part of the exchange, the federal government and 
the state of Utah will retain an overriding interest in the exchanged land because of 
the potential for mineral extraction.184  
The Hill Creek proposal is a win-win for two reasons. First, the Hill Creek 
proposal allows the federal government, the tribes, and the state to share in revenues 
produced on the former reservation lands. Thus, the Hill Creek exchange allows the 
involved parties to bypass the equal value requirement by offering a way to equally 
share the value of the land. Avoiding the equal value requirement is important in this 
case because the valuable mineral resources involved may fluctuate greatly during a 
lengthy appraisal process. 185  Second, the Hill Creek proposal is a win-win for 
environmentalists and developers because it recommends preservation of high-value 
conservation areas and allows mineral extraction in less environmentally and 
culturally sensitive areas.  
While USLEA, URLEA, and the Hill Creek proposal present win-win solutions 
to treat the blue rash, legislative exchanges are not without problems. For example, 
URLEA was delayed for a number of years because of the appraisal process.186 
Similarly, there were delays in administrative exchanges because the BLM failed to 
                                                        
179  Deena Loyola, SITLA, BLM Finalize 60,000-Acre Utah Recreational Land 
Exchange Act, SITLA, (May 9, 2014), http://trustlands.utah.gov/sitla-blm-finalize-60000-
acre-utah-recreational-land-exchange-act/, archived at http://perma.cc/4R7A-W9LQ.  
180 Id. 
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182 S. 27, 113th Cong. (2013) (as reported by S. Comm. on Energy & Natural Res., June 
27, 2013). 
183 Id. 
184 Id. sec. 2, § 5. 
185  See ERIN MASTRANGELO, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN, AN ANALYSIS OF PRICE 
VOLATILITY IN NATURAL GAS MARKETS 1 (2007) (showing a graph depicting the drop in the 
price of natural gas from over $18 per million Btu to $4 per million Btu within a six-month 
time period). 
186 Getting State Trust Lands Out of Wilderness Study Areas: The Utah Recreational 
Land Exchange Act, GRAND CANYON TRUST, http://www.grandcanyontrust.org/utah/trust-
lands_actions.php, archived at http://perma.cc/Z34D-NT96 (last visited Aug. 25, 2014). 
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prioritize funding its portion of the appraisal,187 and mineral potential reports further 
delayed the appraisal process.188  
Another way legislative exchanges pose problems is that they require less 
public scrutiny to complete an exchange. 189  Criticism exists over the fact that 
legislative exchanges do not require public notification.190 They allow Congress to 
bypass important review under NEPA, FLPMA, and the ESA.191 Further, citizens 
cannot appeal Congress’s decision to complete an exchange, and there is no duty to 
disclose appraisal information.192 These are important issues, and the administrative 
land exchange process may help address these problems.193 
Lastly, legislative exchanges create complications because they require 
significant amounts of time and political capital. For example, Congress legislated 
16 of the 132 land exchanges that the BLM initiated and/or completed between 2003 
and 2012.194 Of these sixteen legislated exchanges, the BLM has completed nine and 
seven are pending.195 The nine completed exchanges took an average of nine and a 
half years from inception to the date the BLM finalized the exchange. 196 
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188 Kristen Millis, State and Federal Land Swap, MOAB SUN NEWS (May 1, 2013, 8:00 
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189 BLAELOCH, supra note 23, at 27, 88; Emily Bregel, Delay of Environmental Study 
‘Crux’ of Resolution Copper Debate, Opponents Say, ARIZONA DAILY STAR (Sept. 8, 2013, 
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193 See infra Part IV.C. 
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196 See id. For example, Congress legislated a Montana exchange in the Crow Boundary 
Settlement Act of 1994, which the BLM completed in July of 2003. Id.; Pub. L. No. 103-
444, 108 Stat. 4632 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 410aaa to 410aaa-7 (2012)). The 
California Desert Protection Act of 1994 was introduced in January 1993 and completed in 
phases from November 2003 and June 2006. Pub. L. No. 103-433, 108 Stat. 4471 (codified 
as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 410aaa to 410aaa-7 (2012)); BLM Spreadsheet, supra note 147. 
The Acoma Pueblo Mineral exchange took five years from the passage of the bill in June 
2001 to BLM completion in June 2006. Act of Feb. 6, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-138, 116 Stat. 
6 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 460uu-44 (2012)); GAO EXCHANGE REPORT 2009, 
supra note 145, at 21. The Santo Domingo Pueblo Claims Settlement Act of 2000 was 
completed in January 2008. Pub. L. No. 106-425, 114 Stat. 1890 (codified as amended at 25 
U.S.C. §§ 1777–1777e (2012)); BLM Spreadsheet, supra note 147. The Idaho Land 
Enhancement Act was initiated in 2005 and completed in September 2008. Pub. L. No. 109-
372, 120 Stat. 2645 (2006); BLM Spreadsheet, supra note 147. The Great Sand Dunes 
National Park and Preserve Act of 2000 was completed in 2009. Pub. L. No. 106-530, 114 
Stat. 2527; BLM Spreadsheet, supra note 147. The Ojito Wilderness Act was completed in 
December 2010. Pub. L. No. 109-94, 119 Stat. 2106 (2005) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 
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Additionally, SITLA reports that URLEA took about twelve years to move from 
idea to completion.197  
In contrast, administrative exchanges average just over three and a half years.198 
Thus, land managers and state trust authorities lose an average of six years when 
completing legislative exchanges. Land exchanges between these land managers do 
not need to be so lengthy or costly. The following section details how amendments 
to federal statutes could speed up the process and provide incentives for state trust 
authorities to use administrative land exchanges instead of legislative exchanges.  
 
C.  Amending FLPMA to Treat the Blue Rash Through Administrative Exchanges 
 
Amendments to FLPMA and other statutes could help mitigate the significant 
time and costs it takes to complete an exchange and promote cooperation between 
the federal agency and state trust land authorities. Administrative exchanges may 
also avoid the criticism that legislative exchanges may overlook important federal 
statutory safeguards.199  
There are three ways Congress could amend federal statutes to incentivize 
administrative land exchanges between federal agencies and state trust authorities: 
(1) provide funding to prioritize these exchanges, (2) fast-track the public interest 
determination, and (3) allow equal value to include conservation values and revenue 
sharing.  
 
1.  Increase Agency Funding 
 
With deficits and congressional deadlock over the budget, Congress might be 
hesitant to increase agency funding for land exchanges. But because agency funding 
could be relatively small, time sensitive, and targeted at removing nonfederal 
inholdings from environmentally sensitive areas, Congress should approve the 
funding. In particular, Congress should mandate that the funds be used first for the 
exchange of school trust lands in areas of high conservation value because of the 
public interest in improving federal management of protected lands and the state 
interest of generating revenue for education.  
While finding funds is a complex issue beyond the scope of this Note, the Land 
and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) may be an appropriate source. In 1965, 
Congress created the LWCF in a bipartisan effort to safeguard natural, water, 
                                                        
§ 1132 (2012)); BLM Spreadsheet, supra note 147. The San Juan Basin Wilderness 
Protection Act of 1984 was completed in June 2011. Omnibus Parks and Public Lands 
Management Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-333, sec. 1022, § 104, 110 Stat. 4093, 4095 
(codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.); BLM Spreadsheet, supra note 147. 
197 Loyola, supra note 179 (noting the idea for the land exchange started in 2002 and 
the exchange was completed on May 9, 2014).  
198 See BLM Spreadsheet, supra note 147 (listing land exchanges in western states and 
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199 See BLAELOCH, supra note 23, at 12. 
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cultural heritage, and recreational resources.200 The LWCF takes revenues from 
resource depleting activities, like oil and gas development, on federal lands to supply 
the fund.201 Originally, Congress created the LWCF with a funding level of $900 
million for the purpose of acquiring lands for recreation and conservation. 202 
However, Congress has not fully funded the LWCF on many occasions.203 The 
LWCF is set to expire on September 30, 2015.204 
In addition to funding acquisition of conservation lands, Congress should 
amend 16 U.S.C. § 460l-9 to include funding for land exchanges that involve the 
exchange of environmentally sensitive lands. To make this possible, Congress 
should extend LWCF beyond the 2015 deadline. 205  Appropriations for land 
exchanges from the LWCF should then authorize funding for exchanges that remove 
inholdings from federal conservation areas.  
In addition, appropriations should last for a given period, say five to six years, 
in which time the agencies would need to work closely with state trust authorities 
and other private land owners to effectuate an exchange. Funding for each state 
should be based on the amount of inholdings in corresponding federal conservation 
areas. This process would insure agencies’ efforts for exchanges are focused on the 
most sensitive areas. 
Also, providing these funds helps address the major agency setbacks the GAO 
identified as influencing the decrease in administrative land exchanges. First, with 
funding agencies would be better able to hire or pay qualified realty specialists to 
conduct the exchanges. Second, the funds would help focus agency priorities by 
facilitating exchanges that consolidate environmentally sensitive areas. Lastly, the 
funding would directly address the lack of funding problem. Thus, by providing 
relatively minimal and targeted funding, Congress could amend the LWCF and 
begin to effectively address the problems created by the blue rash in the West. 
 
2.  Public Interest 
 
While providing more funding to bring about administrative exchanges is 
perhaps the most effective way to improve the exchange process, it provides only 
                                                        
200  LAND & WATER CONSERVATION FUND, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT: FUNDING AND 
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Conservation Authorization and Funding Act of 2013 to eliminate the 2015 termination date 
of the LWCF. See S. 338, 113th Cong. (2013). The Bill did not pass out of Committee. Id. 
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part of the treatment of the blue rash. To further address the problem, Congress 
should increase incentives to complete land exchanges between federal agencies and 
state trust authorities by amending the public interest requirement under FLPMA.  
In the context of federal-state trust land exchanges, the issue with the public 
interest determination is one of focus. FLPMA’s current public interest broadly 
focuses on all land exchanges. Yet, the most important public interest consideration 
in a land exchange between federal and nonfederal parties is increasing the ability 
of federal agencies to effectively manage lands, especially those found in 
environmentally sensitive areas. Similarly, there is a strong public interest in 
allowing state trust authorities to effectively manage their lands to generate revenues 
for their beneficiaries. Thus, for certain exchanges the public interest determination 
under FLPMA must be narrowed to reflect these important federal and state interests. 
Congress should amend FLPMA to reflect the public interest of removing 
inholdings from federal conservation areas and helping state trust authorities meet 
their mandates. For example, land exchanges already meet one important public 
interest when they involve lands within federally designated environmentally 
sensitive areas—they improve federal management. FLPMA amendments should 
direct that these exchanges only need to pass through NEPA review and meet the 
equal value requirement.206 
Congress could also amend FLPMA to help solve the conflicts between state 
and federal interests by limiting the deference courts give to an agency’s public 
interest determination in a given exchange. A statutory amendment stating that 
federal-state trust authority exchanges are presumed to be in the pubic interest, 
unless supported by substantial evidence, could tighten this deferential standard. As 
described above, courts review agency exchanges under the arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review.207 By requiring a substantial evidence standard, an agency could 
support its decisions with only what it has on the record.  
Arguably, the substantial evidence standard is not significantly different than 
the arbitrary and capricious standard. 208 But the presumption that these exchanges 
are in the public interest would create a higher standard for the agency to overcome. 
Additionally, the substantial evidence requirement still allows an agency some 
leeway to reject an exchange. This proposed amendment would address GAO’s 
concern with a shift in agency priorities because the presumption would prioritize 
these exchanges by potentially incentivizing agency action.  
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3.  Equal Value 
 
In addition to providing funding and refining the public interest determination, 
amending FLPMA’s equal value requirement could promote the exchange of federal 
and state trust lands. There are three potential ways to amend the equal value 
requirement to incentivize exchanges between federal and state trust authorities: (1) 
place a time limit on the review of an appraisal, (2) allow appraisals to consider 
conservation and ecosystem value, and (3) allow for equal value to include revenue 
sharing. 
As addressed above, one reason that state trust authorities may not participate 
or may lose interest in an administrative exchange is the lengthy appraisal-review 
process. One solution would be to legislatively mandate that department review of 
an appraisal take place within a period of time so that an appraisal does not lose its 
value. Finding the appropriate time frame may need more evaluation, but reviews 
that exceed six months should not be tolerated. Requiring timely review of agency 
appraisals would also help address the problems related to agencies shifting their 
priorities away from completing land exchanges. The timely review will also require 
increased funding from the LWCF or other appropriations. 
Congress could also amend FLPMA’s equal value requirement to allow the 
requirement to include conservation and ecosystem values. Because conservation of 
ecosystems provides inherent economic benefits to society, there should be a 
mechanism in place for conservation values to be considered in an appraisal.209 
There are a variety of ways to place economic value on ecosystem conservation not 
found in the marketplace.210 Ecosystems may be valued for how they contribute to 
society, like purifying water or capturing carbon.211 Value may also be placed on 
conservation actions and their effects on different stakeholders.212  
The equal value/fair market consideration under FLPMA does not account for 
the potential ecosystem values. Amending FLPMA to broaden the scope of equal 
value could allow ecosystem values to be considered in an exchange, thereby 
increasing the value of state trust authority lands that have less development 
potential. In addition, it could create more conservation-focused practices among 
state trust authorities, giving them a new avenue to generate revenues.213 
While it may be difficult to assess a direct value of conservation of western 
lands, the fact remains that these land uses are important and valuable to large 
segments of the American public. Thus, FLPMA should include a provision that 
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allows these public values to be considered. Considering conservation values, 
however, may cause unwanted results. For example, assessing the value of a given 
landscape’s ecological value could be lengthy and expensive. These types of 
appraisals may not always be easy to replicate because different lands have distinct 
flora, fauna, and sensitive habitats. Yet, even with the potential to increase appraisal 
expenses, the costs could be off-set by making sure appraisals are reviewed in a 
timely manner.  
Another way to incentivize exchanges between federal and state trust 
authorities is to amend FLPMA to allow revenue sharing in the equal value 
requirement. Revenue sharing entails that both federal and state trust authorities take 
equal part in the revenues generated from the lands being exchanged. Equal sharing 
in the profits is especially beneficial when exchanges involve lands of high mineral 
value because it allows the exchange parties to bypass a potentially cumbersome 
appraisal process, as seen in URLEA. 
Revenue sharing can be problematic if it applies only to one type of resource 
or does not include unknown mineral deposits.214 Thus, a revenue sharing provision 
must accommodate all potential resource development and take into consideration 
unknown mineral deposits.215 Revenue sharing helps protect the federal interest in 
not losing highly valuable lands and provides incentives for state trust authorities to 
participate in administrative exchanges by limiting the need for lengthy appraisals. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The history of public land laws from disposal to retention has created a 
fragmented ownership in the West. The school land grants led to a spotty pattern of 
state trust land ownership. This in turn creates conflict between the mandates of 
federal agencies—whose mandate is to protect environmentally sensitive areas—
and state trust land authorities—whose mandate is to generate revenues for their 
beneficiaries. Both mandates promote important public interests.  
Legislative land exchanges present potential win-win solutions for extricating 
state trust lands from within federal conservation areas, but they require a process 
that is too long and onerous. However, by improving the process for administrative 
exchanges Congress could promote more efficient exchanges and increase 
cooperation between federal and state trust land managers. Thus, Congress should 
provide funding for land exchanges involving environmentally sensitive areas. 
Additionally, Congress should amend FLPMA’s public interest and equal value 
requirements to incentivize cooperation in the administrative land exchange process. 
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